It’s been awhile since I’ve taken the time to publish anything, mostly out of not feeling like anything I’ve written was worth sharing. Since I push updates similar to this out to soldiers in my unit each month, I’m going to try making this a weekly post in an effort to get back to writing consistently again.

As of 6/15/2023:

The much lauded Ukrainian counter-offensive began on or around June 5th, and so far an sizeable uptick in Ukrainian probing attacks and recon by force has been observed in the south near Zaporizhzhia. Some of these assaults have included Western armored vehicles including American Bradley M2a2 and German designed Leopards. These forces appear to be used in small elements of company and platoon strength so far, in assaults designed to penetrate the first Russian defensive line. A lot has been made of one particular assault that saw a platoon of Brads and at least one Leo destroyed, but given the complexity of breaching operations this is to be expected. There has been a sizeable increase in Russian information operations surround this one assault, so pay attention to sourcing when reading about it.

An interesting turn of events in the Russian MoD and Wagner PMC drama that is playing itself out for everyone to see is recent moves to formalize the organization of volunteer formations like Wagner into MoD controlled formations, likely in an attempt to wrestle control of the organization away from Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of Wagner PMC. This, along with several attempts previously to either out compete Wagner with other PMC formations like Patriot, or to claim Wagner successes as MoD operations, seems to be the latest move in the infighting occurring between “private” entities and the formal Russian military apparatus. Where this will lead, is unknown. Currently, Wagner is claimed to be no longer on the front, having withdrawn after the capture of Bakhmut. Allegedly they are resting and refitting after taking substantial losses in their attempt to take the city.

I’m not going to cover the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam in detail because quite frankly I don’t feel like I have anything to add that is not commonly available. My guess is that the Russians had something to do with it but I am not totally convinced yet.

We are continuing to see a high number of First-Person View (FPV) drones being used to target Russian forces in the Donbas, targeting light armored vehicles, artillery/rocket forces and troops in the open. These cheap, guided munitions seem to be in their development infancy in terms of their modern applicability and technology so it will be interesting to see what the next few months bring in terms of evolution and how they threaten enemy formations. It’s not a war winner, but a cheap, attritional weapon.

The U.S. has committed to over $300bln in additional aid, to include more Bradley IFVs and Strykers. The Bradley is a capable vehicle, the ones knocked out in this fight have done well to protect the crews and we have motorpools full of them in reserve so this is an easy commitment. Long term we will continue to face questions about how far our commitment will aid the Ukrainians, it’s interesting to see how the narrative surrounding this has changed since the beginning of the conflict.

If you read my post in January of 2022, you’ll know I warned about potential cyber attacks against Western banking institutions, government agencies, and other electronic infrastructure. If you’re an Oregon resident, and you have some form of state ID, then you are likely the victim of one of these sorts of cyber attacks. These attacks are designed to impact public opinion, and are below the threshhold requiring a kinetic response. However, we may see an asymmetrical response to such attacks, such as supplying Ukraine with more advanced equipment or some sort of political response.